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CEO compensations in a Stakeholders’ regime: An empirical investigation 
with French listed companies 
Abstract 
Intense controversy has surrounded the publication of the level of Chief Executives Officers’ 
(CEO) compensation over the last years. Some studies have shown a positive relationship 
between CEO pay and firm performance, in the US and in the UK. Executive compensation is 
also closely related to the corporate governance structure which differs significantly in France 
from that in the US and the UK. Traditionally, very little information has been made publicly 
available on executive compensation in France. In 2002, publicly listed companies were asked 
to report CEO and board of directors’ compensation (NRE law, 15 May 2001). Using a 
sample of 110 firms listed in France on the 2002-2004 periods (SBF 120 index), the purpose 
of the study is to shed some light on compensation of CEOs in a country that is known to be 
rather conservative on that point. We test the determinants of CEO compensations defined by 
three measures: individual salary, annual bonus, and total CEO compensation. Preliminary 
results show that executive compensations are explained by size and market-based 
performance for the annual bonus. The findings on risk are more mitigate and indicate that the 
firm specific risk is negatively associated with CEO compensation, as Gray and Cannela 
(1997) have shown. Finally, the corporate governance variables have a significant impact on 
the level of executive compensations. 
Key words 
CEO compensation, corporate governance, performance 
Résumé 
Ces dernières années, la publication du niveau de rémunération des dirigeants a soulevé 
d’intenses controverses. Un certain nombre d’études ont mis en évidence une relation positive 
entre le salaire des dirigeants et la performance de la société, aux Etats-Unis et en Grande-
Bretagne. La rémunération des dirigeants est également proche de la structure du 
gouvernement d’entreprise. Or la structure française de gouvernement d’entreprise est 
différente de celle observée aux États-Unis ou en Grande-Bretagne. En France, la tradition 
voulait que l’on ne divulgue pas ou peu d’information sur le niveau de rémunération des 
dirigeants. Cependant depuis 2002, les sociétés cotées doivent indiquer dans leurs rapports 
annuels le montant des rémunérations des dirigeants et des membres du conseil 
d’administration. (loi NRE, 15 mai 2001). A partir d’un échantillon de 110 sociétés cotées 
françaises sur la période 2002-2004 (indice SBF 120), l’objet de cette recherche est d’apporter 
des éclairages sur la rémunération des dirigeants dans un pays connu pour être plutôt 
conservateur sur le sujet. Pour étudier les déterminants de la rémunération des dirigeants, nous 
avons utilisé trois mesures de cette rémunération : la partie fixe du salaire, le bonus annuel et 
la rémunération globale. Les premiers résultats montrent que les trois mesures de la 
rémunération des dirigeants peuvent être expliquées par la taille de la société, et la partie 
variable (bonus) par la performance boursière. Les résultats sur le risque sont plus mitigés et 
indiquent que le risque spécifique de la firme est négativement associé à la rémunération des 
dirigeants, ce qui confirme les résultats de Gray et Cannela (1997). Enfin, les variables de 
gouvernance ont un impact significatif sur le niveau de rémunération des dirigeants. 
Mots clés 
Rémunération des dirigeants, gouvernement d’entreprise, performance 
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1. Introduction 
Intense controversy has surrounded the publication of the level of Chief Executives Officers’ 
(CEO) compensation over the last years. A host of articles have been published on Executive 
compensation in US and UK companies, where public disclosures of salaries and benefits 
have been usual. In these environments, some studies have concluded that there is a positive 
relationship between CEO pay and firm performance. Executive compensation is also closely 
related to the structure of corporate governance which differs significantly in France from that 
in the US and the UK. Traditionally, very little information has been made publicly available 
on executive compensation in France, but this practice is coming under pressure with 
increasing foreign investment in French companies (Alcouffe and Alcouffe, 2000; Djelic and 
Zarlowski, 2005). In 2002, publicly listed companies were asked to report CEO and board of 
director’s compensation (NRE law, 15 May 2001). 
Using a sample of 110 firms listed in France on the 2002-2004 periods, representing the SBF 
120 index, the purpose of the study is to shed some light on compensation of chief executive 
officers in a country that is known to be rather conservative on that point (Djelic and 
Zarlowski, 2005). We test the determinants of CEO compensations using three measures: the 
individual salary for year t, the annual bonus paid in year t for performance realized in year t-
1, and the total CEO compensation. 
Preliminary results show with a pooled sample that the three metrics of executive 
compensations are explained by size and market-based performance for the annual bonus and 
the total CEO compensation. The findings on risk are more mitigate and indicate that the firm 
specific risk is negatively associated with CEO compensation, as Gray and Cannela (1997) 
have shown. Finally, the corporate governance variables have a significant impact on the level 
of executive compensations.   4
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the French context 
of corporate governance and presents our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes our 
research design, section 4 presents our empirical findings and section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical background 
This paper investigates the compensation of top executives in France with four dimensions: 
the performance of the firm, its risk, its size and its governance attributes. Before developing 
our hypotheses, we underline some specificities of the French corporate governance context. 
The companies of our sample have the legal status of Sociétés Anonymes (SA), which is 
similar to that of the Public Limited Company (PLC) in the UK. For SAs, there are two basic 
governance modes: either the incorporated company with a single board of directors (conseil 
d’administration or CA), or the dual structure corporation comprising a managing board 
(directoire) and supervisory board (conseil de surveillance).  
In the first basic mode of SA, the chairman of the board of directors is entitled to combine this 
function with that of managing director; consequently the firm is led by one person, the 
Président Directeur Général or PDG (chairman and managing director). Recently, the NRE 
law proposed to dissociate the chairman and the managing director. Then, we find a new basic 
mode of SA, where there is a chairman (Président du CA) and a managing director (Directeur 
Général). In the latter governance case, power is shared between a directoire (a body of 
executive directors with wide-ranging powers of general management) and a conseil de 
surveillance (composed of non-executive directors). 
These differences in governance modes are of importance and will be included in our 
determinants model of CEO compensations.   5
2.1 Size and compensation 
Early studies argued that company size, which was assumed to act as a proxy variable 
reflecting a managerial preference for growth of the enterprise, should also enter the director 
pay equation (e.g. Cosh, 1975; Conyon et al., 1995). Baumol (1967) already noted that 
executive salaries appeared to be "...far more closely correlated with the scale of operations 
than with its profitability" (ibid, p. 46). Several arguments may explain the size-compensation 
association. The complexity of large corporations—and of their operations—requires efficient 
top managers. Hence, larger companies have an incentive to reward accordingly the best 
managers—a scarce resource—they may attract. The hierarchical model also predict that the 
larger the firm (i.e. the greater the number of hierarchical level) the higher the CEO 
compensation (Mueller and Yun, 1997; Williamson, 1967).  
 
H1: Top executives compensation is positively associated with firm size. 
 
2.2 Performance and compensation 
Quite a host of articles have focused on the CEO's pay-performance association. Yet, the 
empirical literature on executives pay-performance generally concentrate on US or UK 
managers and find a small or weak association between stock returns and executive pay 
(Benito and Conyon, 1999). Recent studies have focused on other environments such as 
Norway (Firth et al., 1996) or Germany (Elston and Goldberg, 2003) providing international 
insights. This literature suggests a strong and positive link in the pay-performance relation. 
Indeed, as other economic agents, managers want to maximize their own utility function, and 
therefore may not act in the best interest of shareholders. This potential agency problem arises 
in corporations characterised with a separation of ownership and control attributes (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983). The design of particular compensation schemes may help align owners and   6
managers’ utility function, such as the set up of a link between managers’ compensation and 
the firm’s performance (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988). 
 
H2: Top-executives compensation is positively associated with the firm’s performance.  
 
2.3 Risk and compensation 
From a theoretical point of view, reward should be positively associated with the risk of an 
investment. As argued by Andjelkovic et al. (2002, p. 104) “Executives at firms with volatile 
earnings and returns are more likely to forego bonuses or face termination, so they should 
require higher base pay as compensation for this greater risk.” Yet, as pointed out by 
Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), executives of firms with more volatile earnings and stock 
returns will be less willing to put significant amounts of compensation "at risk". Indeed, the 
same effort has not the same probability of generating a reward (i.e. bonus) upon the volatility 
of the firm performance. Due to those two counter arguments, it is difficult to conclude on the 
sign of the risk-compensation link. 
 
H3: Top-executives compensation is associated with the firm’s risk. 
 
2.4 Governance attributes and compensation  
Decisions to hire, to compensate or to fire the top-executives are devoted to the Board of 
Directors (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Boards may rely on different sources to determine the 
level of compensation for their executives, as for example consultants hired by the CEO (Core 
et al., 1999). Hence, the compensation contracts may be optimized for the CEO, not for the 
company. The presence of a compensation committee helps mitigate this potential risk. Such 
governance device potentially has thus an important monitoring and mediator function in the   7
setting of top compensation, as companies without such committees may not have the 
appropriate mechanisms to determine whether CEOs undertook the desired actions and then 
appropriately reward the CEO. 
 
H4: Top-executive compensation is negatively associated with compensation committee. 
 
The characteristics of the administrators, members of the compensation committee, are 
determined by the way they are chosen, i.e. by the work of the nomination committee. When 
selecting and submitting new candidates, the committee may prevent a selection of the 
members of the board “subject to the patronage of the CEO” (Benito and Conyon, 1999, p. 
122). We also must add that the compensation and the nomination committee are often the 
same one. 
 
H5: Top executive compensation is negatively associated with nomination committee 
 
Following the example of the Caburry Report in 1992, successive French reports on corporate 
governance (Viénot Reports in 1995 and 1999, Bouton Report in 2002, and AFEP-MEDEF 
Report in 2003), issued by working groups sponsored by the AFEP (Association Française 
des Entreprises privées, Association of French private-sector companies) and the MEDEF 
(Mouvement des Entreprises en France, the French business confederation), insisted on the 
creation of three committees : the audit committee, the compensation committee and the 
nomination committee. A fourth one, the governance committee, emerged also among French 
companies. We see the presence of these committees as a proxy for the compliance of a 
company to governance principles. We then hypothesized that the presence of an audit and a 
governance committee, even if not directly linked to the compensation of the CEO, may have   8
a negative impact on CEO’s pay, as they outline the commitment of a company to governance 
principles and the independence of the board.  
 
H6: Top executive compensation is negatively associated with audit committee 
H7: Top executive compensation is negatively associated with governance committee 
 
The reports also insisted on the presence, on the Board of directors, of a minimum number of 
independent directors, i.e. a director who “has no relationship of any kind whatsoever with the 
corporation, its group or the management of either that is such as to colour his or her 
judgment” (AFEP-MEDEF Report 2003). As Pfeffer (1981) argues that internal board 
members are more loyal to management, we suppose that independent directors are less 
subject to influence by CEO. 
 
H8: Top executive compensation is negatively associated with the percentage of independent 
directors sitting on the board.  
 
Finally, empirical evidence has been given that agency problems are higher when the CEO is 
also the board chair (Yermack, 1996). Concerning the board structure, in the French system, 
companies are allowed either to have a “classical” board of administrators, or to have a 
Conseil de Surveillance (composed of non –executive directors) and a Directoire (a body of 
executive directors). In the first case, the chairman of the board can be the Président 
Directeur Général (PDG, chairman and managing director) or only the Président du Conseil 
d’Administration (chairman of the board), and delegate the executive power to a Directeur 
Général. We hypothesized that a chairman combining both functions would have much more 
power within the board of directors, and then have more influence on compensation setting.   9
H9: Top executive compensation is negatively associated with the dissociation of the 
chairman of the board and the managing director roles.  
 
3. Research design 
3.1.  Sample 
The initial population of our sample is the SBF 120 index’s French listed firms over a three-
year period (2002-2004)
1. The compensation and governance data were collected from annual 
reports of the SBF 120 index firms. We obtained compensation and governance data of 110 
companies and gathered financial data (size, performance) from Thomson Financial database. 
Due to data limitations our sample consists of 268 observations over a three-year (2002-2004) 
period, which represents 99 different French listed firms. 
Table 1 describes the economic and compensation characteristics of our sample. It is 
composed of large firms (mean sales of 8757 million euros), with relatively low ROA (mean 
of 2.761). 
Insert Table 1 here 
Table 2 describes the governance characteristics of our sample. Almost 85% of our sample 
firms have an audit committee (87.31%) and a compensation committee (84.70 %), whereas 
two-thirds of them have a nomination committee and only 5.22 % a governance committee. 
The repartition between the two governance modes are one-third for the dual structure and 
two-thirds for the basic mode of SA (Société Anonyme), and half (51.87%) of the CEO are 
chairman and managing director of the firm. 
Insert Table 2 here 
                                                 
1 Since 2002, French publicly listed companies were asked to report CEO and board of directors’ compensation 
(NRE law, 15 May 2001).   10
Finally our sample is composed of firms operating in a variety of different industries. It 
includes an industrial classification with 10 different standards (Dow Jones market sector), 
whith some concentration in the consumer cyclical (26.7%), financials (15.6%), industrial 
(20%) and technology (14.5%) industries. 
Insert Table 3 here 
 
3.2.  Compensations models 
We test three empirical models in order to explain the level of CEO compensations in France. 
First, we study the determinants of the fix part of CEO compensation, i.e. the individual’s 
salary for year t (CEO_SALt). Second, we assess the determinants of the variable part of CEO 
compensation, i.e. the annual bonus paid in year t for performance in year t-1 (CEO_bonust). 
And finally, we test a model where the independent variable is the total CEO compensation, 
i.e. the sum of salary and annual bonus (CEO_TOTt). The empirical models are the following: 
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With, 
-  CEO_SALt is the individual salary for year t of firm i CEO.   11
-  CEO_bonust is the annual bonus paid in year t of firm i CEO, for performance in year 
t-1. 
-  CEO_TOTt is the sum of salary and annual bonus paid in year t of firm i CEO. 
-  lagSalesi,t is the sales (in million euros) at the end of year t-1 for firm i. 
-  LagROAi,t is the return of asset for year t-1 of firm i. 
-  LagRETi,t is the market return for year t-1 of firm i. 
-  Betai,t is the CAPM specific risk of firm i for year t. 
-  COMP_COMi,t is a dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firm i has a compensation 
committee in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
-  AUD_COMi,t is a dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firm i has an audit committee in 
year t, and 0 otherwise. 
-  NOM_COMi,t is a dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firm i has a nomination 
committee in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
-  GOV_COMi,t is a dichotomous variable equals 1 if the firm i has a governance 
committee in year t, and 0 otherwise. 
-  CAi,t is a dichotomous variable equals 1 if the governance form of the firm i is the 
basic one, and 0 otherwise. 
-  PDGi,t is a dichotomous variable equals 1 if the CEO is the chairman and the 
managing director of the firm i, and 0 otherwise. 
-  INDi,t is the percentage of independent directors composing the board of directors of 
firm i in year t. 
-  YRi,t is a time indicator variable that equals 1 if an observation is from fiscal year t, 
and 0 otherwise. 
-  Indusi,t are dummy variables (CYC, ENE, FIN, HCR, IDU, NCY, TEC, TLS, UTI) 
coded 1 if the firm belongs respectively to the Dow Jones market sectors consumer   12
cyclical, energy, financials, healthcare, industrial, consumer non-cyclical, technology, 
telecommunication or utilities, and 0 otherwise. 
 
4. Empirical results 
Results of models (1) (2) and (3) for the pooled sample are presented below (table 4). VIFs 
calculation allows us to ensure that no multicolinearity problem affects our results. No 
variable of our models (see Table 6, Appendix 1) have a VIF greater than 4, which is far from 
the critical value of 10 (Netter et al., 1989). 
Insert Table 4 Here 
 
This table presents the regression results for the pooled data (2002-2004) on our three 
measures of CEO compensations: the individual salary, the annual bonus paid and the total 
compensation. As hypothesized in H1, the size (measured by the Sales of firm i in year t-1) is 
strongly and positively related to the three dimensions of CEO compensation. This is 
consistent with what has been found in other studies (see Benito and Conyon (1999) for UK, 
Firth et al. (1996) for Norway, Elston and Goldberg (2003) for Germany).  
 
Our results on performance are mixed.  We tested two different variables as a proxy for 
performance: the ROA, which measures the performance of a firm with accounting data, and 
the market return (RET), which measures performance from a financial market point of view. 
As both variables appear to be not significantly correlated
2, it seemed useful to test them in 
the same model.  While market returns has, as hypothesized in H2, a significant positive 
relation with CEO bonus and a weaker relation with CEO total compensation, the ROA only 
                                                 
2 See appendix 1 for the correlation matrix.   13
presents a negative significant relation with CEO fixed compensation and no significant 
relation with CEO bonus or CEO total compensation. This result suggests that performance 
measured with accounting data is not relevant for firms or compensation committees in 
determining CEO compensation. 
 
Also contrary to our hypothesis H3, risk, measured with Beta, is significantly negatively 
related with CEO bonus and rather weakly and still negatively with CEO total compensation.  
 
Governance variables show globally more consistent results: the audit committee has a 
significant and positive relation with CEO fixed and total compensation, and no relation with 
CEO bonus. On the contrary the compensation committee show a negative and significant 
association with CEO fixed and total compensation, and no relation with CEO bonus. 
Nomination and Governance committees have no relation with any dimension of CEO 
compensation. Concerning the structure of the board, it appears that when the CEO is 
chairman of the board and managing director, his fixed compensation is diminished 
(significant negative relation with CEO_SAL), but his bonus and total compensation have no 
relation with his status. Finally, the percentage of independent directors on the board has a 
positive and significant relation with CEO fixed and total compensation.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Executive compensation has recently become an important subject of debate in non Anglo-
Saxon countries. Yet, there is little knowledge about it in France. The changes in the stock 
exchange regulation in 2001 have provided access to the compensation of top-managers 
making this study timely, especially in such a low transparent environment. The results of the   14
paper show that overall the size of the firm seems to have a major impact on executive 
compensation in France. The pay-performance association is less straightforward as it 
depends on the performance variable used. The risk of the company affects negatively the 
compensation package. Lastly, the presence of compensation committee is negatively 
associated with CEO compensation, whereas other governance variables present mixed 
results. Overall, one may conclude that the complexity of the firm’s operation, proxied with 
the size of the company, has a positive impact on top executives’ compensation, mitigated by 
the presence of a compensation committee. On the whole, fixed and total compensation are 
notably more correlated with our governance variables than CEO bonus, which appears not to 
be really impacted by those variables.    15
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Table 1 – Economic and compensation characteristics 
 
<   Quantiles >  
Variable N Mean  S.D.  Min  0.25 Mdn  0.75  Max 
lagSales  268 8757.659 12489.230 43.321 638.450 2398.755 11815.000 54869.000
lagROA  268 2.761  4.658 -13.613 0.496 2.567 4.941 17.513
lagRET  268  -7.008 36.291 -90.995 -31.488 -7.148 15.948 97.078
Beta  265  1.327 0.832 0.006 0.614 1.223 1.997 3.307
CEO_SAL  268  732.1399 515.6137 57.917 327.9215 629.5935 980 3390.981
CEO_bonus  268  420.7363 592.3738 0 0 145.9335 667.5 3472.594
CEO_tot  268  1152.876 887.9999 57.917 446.12 913.92 1609.985 4380.574
IND  268 34.920  25.273 0.000 10.317 36.364 53.333 100.000
LagSales is the sales at the end of year t-1 for firm i; lagROA is the return of asset for year t-1 of firm i; lagRET is 
market return for year t-1 of firm i; Beta is the CAPM specific risk of firm i for year t; CEO_SAL is the individual 
salary for year t of firm i CEO; CEO_bonus is the annual bonus paid in year t of firm i CEO, for performance in  
year t-1; CEO_TOT is the sum of salary and annual bonus paid in year t of firm i CEO; IND is the percentage of 
independent directors composing the board of directors of firm i in year t. 
 
 
Table 2 – Governance characteristics 
 
Variable     N  Percentage  Cum. 
Total number of observations  268 100  
AUD_COM  0 34 12.69  12.69
  1 234 87.31  100
COMP_COM  0 41 15.3  15.3
  1 227 84.7  100
NOM_COM  0 92 34.33  34.33
  1 176 65.67  100
GOV_COM  0 254 94.78  94.78
 1  14 5.22  100
CA  0 96 35.82  35.82
 1  172 64.18  100
PDG  0 129 48.13  48.13
  1 139 51.87  100
AUD_COM is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm i has an audit committee in year t, and 0 otherwise; 
COMP_COM is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm i has a compensation committee in year t, and 0 otherwise;
NOM_COM is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm i has a nomination committee in year t, and 0 otherwise; 
GOV_COM is a dummy variable equals 1 if the firm i has a governance committee in year t, and 0 otherwise; CA 
is a dummy variable equals 1 if the governance form of the firm i is the basic one, 0 otherwise; PDG is a dummy 
variable equals 1 if the CEO is the chairman and the managing director of the firm, and 0 otherwise. 
   18
 
Table 3 – Industry classification 
 
Dow Jones Market Sectors  Label  N  Percent  Cum. 
        
BSC  Basic Material  9 3.36  3.36
CYC  Consumer Cyclical  72 26.87  30.22
ENE  Energy 6 2.24  32.46
FIN  Financials 42 15.67  48.13
HCR  Healthcare 8 2.99  51.12
IDU  Industrial 55 20.52  71.64
NCY  Consumer, Non-cyclical  26 9.7  81.34
TEC  Technology 39 14.55  95.9
TLS  Telecommunications 2 0.75  96.64
UTI  Utilities 9 3.36  100
Total Total  268 100     
CYC, ENE, FIN, HCR, IDU, NCY, TEC, TLS and UTI are indicator variables coded 1 if the firm belongs respectively
to the consumer cyclical, energy, financials, healthcare, industrial, consumer non cyclical, technology, telecommuni-
cations or utilities Dow Jones Market Sectors. 
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Table 4 - Pooled regressions 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   CEO_SAL CEO_bonus CEO_TOT 
lagSales  0.013 0.018 0.033
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lagROA  -15.737 5.577 -12.548
  (0.022) (0.416) (0.199)
lagRET  0.723 2.010 2.858
  (0.381) (0.019) (0.061)
Beta  -0.020 -84.685 -123.467
  (1.000) (0.059) (0.092)
AUD_COM  887.108 57.020 965.075
  (0.000) (0.529) (0.000)
COMP_COM  -798.940 124.535 -643.921
  (0.000) (0.126) (0.006)
NOM_COM  29.043 13.874 -4.071
  (0.684) (0.849) (0.975)
GOV_COM  -17.553 -88.313 -66.536
  (0.874) (0.571) (0.718)
CA  134.102 57.618 161.695
  (0.133) (0.547) (0.297)
PDG  -184.229 76.131 -48.273
  (0.023) (0.428) (0.752)
IND  3.779 0.900 4.321
  (0.001) (0.419) (0.010)
Time fixed effects   Included Included Included
Industry fixed effects  Included Included Included
   
Constant  403.885 64.896 521.725
   (0.001) (0.680) (0.021)
Number of observations  265 266  265
R-square 0.468 0.342  0.455
P-values in parentheses, errors are White-corrected 
CEO_SAL is the individual salary for year t of firm i CEO; CEO_bonus is the annual bonus paid in year t of firm i  
CEO, for performance in year t-1; CEO_TOT is the sum of salary and annual bonus paid in year t of firm i CEO; 
lagSales is the sales at the end of year t-1 for firm i; lagROA is the return of asset for year t-1 of firm i; lagRET is  
market return for year t-1 of firm i; Beta is the CAPM specific risk of firm i for year t; AUD_COM is a dummy  
variable equals 1 if the firm i has an audit committee in year t, and 0 otherwise; COMP_COM is a dummy variable 
equals 1 if the firm i has a compensation committee in year t, and 0 otherwise; NOM_COM is a dummy variable 
equals 1 if the firm i has a nomination committee in year t, and 0 otherwise; GOV_COM is a dummy variable 
equals 1 if the firm i has a governance committee in year t, and 0 otherwise; CA is a dummy variable equals 1 if the
governance form of the firm i is the basic one, 0 otherwise; PDG is a dummy variable equals 1 if the CEO is the  
chairman and the managing director of the firm, and 0 otherwise.IND is the percentage of independent directors  
composing the board of directors of firm i in year t. 
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Appendix 1 

















CEO_TOT  1.000  
    
    
CEO_SAL  0.9297* 1.000  
  (0.000)  
    
CEO_BONUS  0.5151* 0.1631* 1.000  
  (0.000) (0.042)  
    
lagSales  0.3274* 0.2396* 0.3194* 1.000  
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  
    
lagROA  -0.1939* -0.2401* 0.0393 -0.1322* 1.000 
  (0.006) (0.000) (0.4929) (0.0205)  
    
lagRET  0.0185 -0.0332 0.1275* -0.0394 0.0948 1.000
  (0.7495) (0.5679) (0.0275) (0.4969) (0.1018) 
    
Beta  -0.1004* -0.0224 -0.2169* -0.0469 -0.2180* -0.1419* 1.000
   (0.0816) (0.6980) (0.0001) (0.4165) (0.001) (0.0147)  
. Pearson correlation 
(.) Sig. (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed) 
CEO_SAL is the individual salary for year t of firm i CEO; CEO_bonus is the annual bonus paid in year t of firm i 
CEO, for performance in year t-1; CEO_TOT is the sum of salary and annual bonus paid in year t of firm i CEO; 
lagSales is the sales at the end of year t-1 for firm i; lagROA is the return of asset for year t-1 of firm i; lagRET is  
market return for year t-1 of firm i; Beta is the CAPM specific risk of firm i for year t. 
 
Table 6 – Variance Inflation Factors 
 
   (1)  (2)  (3) 
   CEO_SAL  CEO_bonus  CEO_TOT 
Variable  VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF VIF 1/VIF 
                    
COMP_COM  3.37 0.296777 3.24 0.308934 3.37 0.296777
CA  3.22 0.310738 3.04 0.329298 3.22 0.310738
AUD_COM  3.21 0.311527 3.01 0.332474 3.21 0.311527
PDG  2.99 0.334293 2.88 0.347226 2.99 0.334293
Beta  1.93 0.518764 1.91 0.524746 1.93 0.518764
NOM_COM  1.84 0.542025 1.84 0.544522 1.84 0.542025
lagRET  1.71 0.584713 1.67 0.600196 1.71 0.584713
lagSales  1.44 0.692464 1.44 0.692911 1.44 0.692464
lagROA  1.32 0.759232 1.31 0.761491 1.32 0.759232
IND  1.23 0.815557 1.24 0.805829 1.23 0.815557
GOV_COM  1.07 0.931172 1.08 0.927695 1.07 0.931172
Mean VIF  2.94     2.91    2.94    
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